Iran and Saudi Arabia: A U.S. Strategy for Nuclear Verification and Regional Security
Executive Judgment
The United States should pursue coordinated nuclear and regional security agreements with Iran, while giving Saudi Arabia and other directly affected partners a substantive role in arrangements governing their security. Each agreement should carry distinct obligations, verification procedures, and consequences for noncompliance.
The Council recommends three decisions for Washington:
- Establish a nuclear negotiating mandate that separates urgent restoration of safeguards from the longer-term restrictions necessary to prevent a nuclear weapons capability.
- Agree with Saudi Arabia and other affected partners on a regional agenda addressing civilian protection, maritime security, and assistance enabling cross-border attacks.
- Define, before commitments are made, which benefits depend on which verified actions, how violations will be addressed, and what requires congressional review or legislation.
A nuclear-only agreement could leave regional threats insufficiently addressed. A comprehensive settlement could make every achievable improvement dependent on resolving disputes involving numerous actors. Coordinated agreements offer a more workable alternative, provided their connections are explicit and enforcement remains credible.
This is a strategy for managing consequential disagreements. It does not presume a regional reconciliation or a common interpretation of past events.
The Strategic Problem
American policy must protect U.S. personnel and partners, prevent nuclear proliferation, preserve lawful commercial navigation, and reduce the danger of a wider war. Pressure should be directed toward identifiable changes in conduct, with a credible explanation of what verified implementation would deliver.
The principal nuclear obstacle is an inadequate basis for verification. In September, the IAEA reported that missing information and access prevented it from verifying the status of declared facilities and associated material. Its Board subsequently reaffirmed findings of safeguards noncompliance and called for corrective action. These findings establish a serious proliferation concern; they do not themselves establish that Iran possesses a nuclear weapon.
Iran disputes important elements of this assessment. In a September communication circulated by the IAEA, its permanent mission attributed verification obstacles to military attacks and continuing threats, challenged the legal basis of reinstated Security Council requirements, and connected renewed safeguards activity to an end to hostilities. These are Iranian government positions, not findings endorsed by the Agency.
The Council’s judgment is that protecting inspectors and addressing genuine operational hazards are necessary for implementation. Those requirements cannot become an indefinite substitute for access and material accounting. Negotiators must address security conditions and verification together while preserving the Agency’s independent mandate.
Saudi Arabia And Iran: Positions And Constraints
Saudi Arabia’s priorities encompass immediate protection and a diplomatic path away from recurring escalation. In June, Saudi official reporting documented the Kingdom’s support for the Washington–Tehran understanding. In October, its Foreign Ministry welcomed Security Council condemnation of Houthi attacks and highlighted threats to civilian facilities, airports, energy infrastructure, and maritime navigation. It also supported practical cooperation to prevent further arms and other support reaching the Houthis.
The policy implication is that Riyadh should help shape regional obligations and defensive planning. Consultation conducted after negotiating positions have already been settled would offer limited reassurance.
Iran’s September communication places sovereignty, the security of nuclear facilities, the consequences of military attacks, and the reliability of counterpart commitments at the center of its argument. It also disputes the scope of some verification requirements. Washington should address practical concerns and reciprocal implementation without accepting Tehran’s legal claims or treating broad assurances as evidence of compliance.
These interests overlap only partially. Washington could value nuclear constraints that Riyadh regards as inadequate protection against regional attacks. Iran could seek economic benefits or assurances beyond what U.S. officials can lawfully deliver. Identifying these differences is a prerequisite to a workable agreement.
Other Gulf governments and Israel have distinct security concerns. Saudi Arabia cannot represent every affected state, and no U.S.–Iran understanding can settle their disputes without appropriate participation. European partners also have an important role in coordinating nuclear diplomacy and the implementation of commitments within their respective authority.
The Policy Choice
A narrow nuclear arrangement would concentrate expertise on a defined problem: nuclear material, facilities, monitoring, and access. It could reduce proliferation risk without resolving regional conflicts. Its weakness is that partners could remain exposed while Iran receives benefits, including economic resources that cannot be made entirely immune from diversion or fungibility.
A comprehensive settlement would seek nuclear constraints and regional commitments together. Its advantage is coherence. Its weakness is dependence on numerous parties, domestic approvals, and different methods of verification. Tehran cannot credibly guarantee every decision of every aligned organization, and regional powers cannot determine Yemen’s, Lebanon’s, or Iraq’s political future among themselves.
The Council favors coordinated agreements. Nuclear specialists should negotiate nuclear restrictions; affected regional governments should participate in arrangements addressing their security. A common U.S. strategy should determine sequencing and any connections between benefits.
The strongest objection is that Iran could obtain relief on one track while obstructing another. The answer is staged benefits, continued protection of partners, and predetermined consequences. Rejecting a useful nuclear restriction does not necessarily improve regional security; accepting one does not require overlooking regional violations.
Define The Nuclear Outcome
The immediate objective should be restoration of the information, access, and monitoring necessary to establish a credible baseline. Iran should provide declarations and access enabling the IAEA to determine the location and status of safeguarded material, examine relevant facilities, and address unresolved questions.
Physical damage to a facility does not establish that its material is accounted for. Nor can one inspection reconstruct a prolonged loss of knowledge. Negotiators should distinguish initial access, verified accounting, and sustained monitoring as separate milestones.
The Council recommends seeking an interim arrangement that verifies suspension of enrichment and reprocessing, prevents expansion or unmonitored relocation of relevant capabilities and material, and establishes a dated program for resolving outstanding safeguards issues. An interim arrangement should not relax existing obligations or imply that historical inventories have been verified when they have not.
Limited reciprocal measures could accompany initial verified steps. Substantial relief should require a materially stronger result: credible accounting of relevant material, effective monitoring, and implementation of agreed restrictions. A political promise to admit inspectors would be insufficient.
The longer-term objective should be an exclusively peaceful program with no accumulation of highly enriched uranium, no nuclear weapons-related activities, and restraints sufficient to give the international community meaningful warning of a prohibited change. Washington should prioritize externally supplied civilian fuel as a lower-risk alternative to domestic production, supported by reliable supply arrangements.
Any later proposal permitting domestic enrichment would require resolution of applicable international obligations and a separate assessment of enrichment levels, inventories, installed capacity, access, duration, and reversibility. Technical specialists must assess the package as a whole. The Council does not recommend treating a nominal enrichment ceiling as sufficient protection in the absence of reliable material accounting and monitoring.
These are proposed negotiating objectives. The IAEA determines technical findings within its mandate; governments negotiate additional commitments and secure any necessary authorization.
Make Regional Participation Operational
Washington and Riyadh should develop a prioritized assessment of risks to population centers, civilian infrastructure, and commercial routes. Other affected partners should contribute through appropriate channels.
The assessment should identify what existing systems can protect, where training or maintenance is deficient, and what additional procurement could realistically deliver. Defense commitments should account for interceptor stocks, sustainment, delivery times, and competing demands on U.S. resources.
Regional negotiations should initially target conduct that can be assessed: attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, interference with commercial navigation, and material assistance enabling prohibited attacks. All participating governments should be held to the applicable standards protecting civilians.
An incident mechanism should preserve records, identify responsible authorities, and distinguish an attack’s occurrence from responsibility for directing or enabling it. Protection can proceed while attribution remains under examination. Findings should state evidentiary confidence.
Iranian support, influence, operational coordination, and direct command are different propositions. Evidence supporting one does not automatically prove the others. Documented assistance enabling attacks should nevertheless carry consequences even where direct command cannot be demonstrated.
Regional diplomacy must also preserve local political ownership. Reducing external support for conflict can assist a Yemeni settlement, but cannot replace a Yemeni political process. The same principle applies to Lebanon and Iraq: external arrangements should strengthen lawful, accountable institutions rather than allocate influence over them.
Connect Incentives To Performance
Every proposed sanctions measure should specify its legal authority, beneficiary, duration, triggering action, and response to noncompliance. Treasury should assess whether an offer is practically usable, alongside its formal availability.
Initial benefits should be proportionate to verified steps. Larger benefits should follow more consequential and sustained implementation. Officials should identify any conditions connecting nuclear and regional performance before offering relief.
Controlled channels and monitoring may reduce misuse. They cannot eliminate the possibility that economic relief frees resources elsewhere. That residual risk must be weighed against the security value obtained.
Humanitarian access should be treated separately from discretionary bargaining rewards. OFAC maintains authorizations and exceptions for specified humanitarian trade, subject to restrictions. U.S. policy should support lawful delivery and appropriate checks against diversion.
Enforcement should distinguish correctable technical failures, material violations, and conduct undermining the framework’s essential purpose. A minor reporting failure should not automatically destroy useful constraints. A major attack should trigger a broader reassessment rather than be insulated by formal compliance elsewhere.
Separate agreements therefore need defined consequences and consultation procedures, with room for urgent lawful protection. They should preserve functioning restrictions where doing so remains strategically valuable.
Assign Responsibility And Resources
The National Security Council should coordinate a presidentially approved negotiating mandate and rules connecting the agreements. State should lead diplomacy; Defense should assess protection and escalation risks; Treasury should design deliverable sanctions measures; and the intelligence community should assess threats and attribution.
Congress should be engaged before negotiators rely on legislative changes. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act provides review and reporting requirements for covered agreements. Applicable statutory procedures must be followed, including requirements concerning verification assessments and sanctions relief.
Foreign relations and foreign affairs committees should examine diplomatic commitments and verification. Armed services committees should scrutinize missions and readiness; appropriators should assess recurring costs; and relevant financial committees should examine sanctions provisions. Oversight should test what officials have promised, what they can deliver, and what happens after failure.
The administration should use existing diplomatic channels where adequate. Additional requests should identify inspection requirements, specialist staffing, intelligence needs, and defensive capability gaps. No responsible cost estimate can precede an agreed scope of commitments.
Washington cannot guarantee another government’s conduct, dictate IAEA findings, or promise legislation by a future Congress. Iran and regional partners must likewise make commitments matched to their authority and practical capacity.
Test The Framework Before Expanding It
The Council recommends a ninety-day implementation review after adoption of the strategy, rather than a deadline for a comprehensive agreement.
The first phase should establish baselines, assign responsibilities, and identify legally available reciprocal measures. Negotiators should then test specific obligations with counterparts and partners, with IAEA involvement on technical requirements. The review should identify accepted commitments, verification gaps, resources, and unresolved political obstacles.
Decisions should be tested against adverse conditions:
If nuclear verification improves while regional attacks continue, preserve useful monitoring while addressing attacks and withholding benefits whose conditions remain unmet. Reassess broader relief according to the agreements and the gravity of the conduct.
If Riyadh and Washington disagree on sequencing, identify the particular exposure and possible mitigation. Consultation must disclose substantive disagreement rather than conceal it.
If attribution is uncertain, protect threatened populations and gather evidence. A response directed at Iran requires a defensible basis connecting it to the conduct concerned.
If Iran implements obligations but promised benefits fail to arrive, distinguish legal barriers, administrative delay, and private-sector decisions. An undeliverable offer undermines subsequent bargaining.
If negotiations fail, retain useful crisis channels and lawful humanitarian access where possible. Continued defense and pressure should remain linked to identifiable objectives and available resources.
Measure Security, Not Diplomatic Activity
Quarterly reporting should include an unclassified assessment and a classified annex where necessary. Nuclear reporting should draw on IAEA findings and distinguish access from accounting, monitoring continuity, and resolution of outstanding questions.
Regional reporting should assess attack severity, civilian harm, targets, and confidence in attribution alongside incident counts. Maritime reporting should examine safe commercial passage and attempted interference. Defense reporting should address readiness and sustainment; humanitarian reporting should assess actual delivery of lawful essential goods.
These indicators should guide decisions about benefits, enforcement, and resources. They should not be combined into a score that conceals a grave failure behind unrelated gains.
The Outcome Usmep Advocates
American policy should combine credible protection of regional partners with verifiable nuclear restraint and a defined route toward reciprocal implementation.
Saudi Arabia should help shape arrangements affecting its security. Iran should face specific obligations and consequences, with deliverable benefits for verified performance. Other affected countries must retain ownership of their political futures.
Limited agreements may precede a broader settlement. Their value depends on reducing identifiable risks, surviving foreseeable disputes, and improving civilian security at an acceptable cost. That should be the standard governing both American commitments and regional cooperation.